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原文來源：
Geopolitical futures
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-world-and-a-small-war/
原文摘要：
No war is small when you are living in it, but the world is large, and large w
ars are rare. At the same time, wars reverberate in unexpected ways. A small w
ar here might make another war elsewhere deadlier, or it might help prevent a
war elsewhere. No war can be understood simply in and of itself. Therefore, th
e war in Ukraine must be considered not only in its own terms but also in term
s of its reverberations. And since reverberations are by definition disorderly
, in terms of their connection to both the primary war and its ultimate import
ance, I will arbitrarily embed the reverberations into my model of the world.


爭不僅要考慮其本身，還要考慮其影響。由於混響在定義上是無序的，就他們與戰主要爭

及

Poland has emerged, for the moment, as the leader of Europe. Geographically, i
t is closest to Ukraine, and therefore much of NATO’s force has been statione
d there. Most important, the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division is there. That means
that the 82nd is working with Polish forces, many of whom have already trained
 for several years with U.S. armored forces in Poland. For the U.S., that mean
s its forces are made aware of the terrain they may be fighting on and get the
 chance to develop some familiarity with Poles. Their mission is to deter or r
epel a Russian invasion of Poland or, if ordered, to move into Ukraine and eng
age and defeat Russian forces there.


擊退俄羅斯對波蘭的入侵，或者如果接到命令，則進入烏克蘭並與那裡的俄羅斯軍隊交戰

並擊敗。

After World War II, to ward off Soviet domination of the Continent, the United
 States had to position its forces in Europe by placing a main force in German
y. Inevitably, this wove the two previously hostile countries together politic
ally and socially. It also created necessary investments that had a role in th
e German economic miracle, a miracle that eventually made Germany the leading
power in Europe – something inconceivable in 1945. German well-being became a
 strategic requirement for the United States, and being an American priority i
n a shattered Europe meant a great deal.



The situation today is not as stark as it was in 1945. The basing of U.S. forc
es in a country makes the host country’s stability and predictability a U.S.
strategic interest, and Polish geography and interests now link to American in
terests in a relationship that is blossoming from what it was. The United Stat
es has felt alienated from Europe because of Europe’s reluctance to fulfill i
ts financial commitments to NATO, and Europe felt alienated from what it saw a
s American hyper-militarism. Ukraine has generated a shift in Europe that may
or may not last. But what will likely last is the presence of American troops
in Poland. The U.S. still has troops in Germany more than 30 years after the e
nd of the Cold War. For the Americans, deployments are habit-forming.



Poland’s geography and its memory of the consequences of war bond it with the
 Americans. The end of the Ukraine war will imprint a model on the U.S. of fut
ure threats that aligns with Poland’s own view. Poland is under threat of de
facto expulsion from the EU for violating EU judicial standards. That is a min
or test of how the European balance of power might shift.



Elsewhere, the Turks have done an interesting thing, sortieing a substantial p
art of their navy into the Black Sea, where the Russian ship Moskva was sunk.
Turkey has kept its distance from much of the Ukraine war, although it made so
me drones available to Ukrainian forces. Turkey is historically hostile to Rus
sia but lately regards the U.S. as unpredictable. It has balanced carefully th
ere. But the poor performance of Russian forces in Ukraine has likely caused t
he Turks to reevaluate Russia’s threat. Turkey likely no longer equates Russi
an and American strength. From Turkey’s point of view, if Russia were able to
 use its navy to impose itself on the Black Sea while eliminating or forcing U
krainian forces armed with anti-ship missiles farther away from the coast, thi
s would ease Russian operations in the Black Sea. Such an outcome would also p
ose a potential threat to Turkey. Turkey is a member of NATO, and Russia may e
ventually decide Turkey’s fleet is a threat and strike its ships and ports. T
he Turks have moved into the Black Sea to preempt a Russian move by raising th
e risks beyond what Russia can incur. At the same time, this will involve a de
gree of coordination with Ukraine.


如果俄羅斯能夠利用其海軍將自己強加於黑海，同時消滅或迫使配備反艦導彈的烏克蘭軍



In challenging Russia in the Black Sea, another avenue is opened up. Turkey ha
s significant interests in both the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia ha
s been advancing its interests there to the concern of Turkey. Russia is in no
 position to pose a military challenge to Turkey at the moment, nor is Turkey
likely to move militarily. Covert actions and diplomacy are the key. And given
 Russia’s performance in Ukraine, countries like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan mi
ght reconsider their relations to Russia. The weakness of Russia to this point
 opens the door to strategic realignments, forces Turkey to assert itself in t
he Black Sea and potentially clears a path for Turkey to pursue other interest
s.


點上的弱點為戰略調整打開了大門，迫使土耳其在黑海維護自己的地位，並可能為土耳其

追求其他利益掃清道路。

Then there is China. China entered into a relationship with Russia to create a
 massive counterweight to the United States. But despite their public statemen
ts, the Chinese have realized that a relationship with Russia is a liability a
nd not an asset. Russia does not have the weight to draw the U.S. away from th
reatening China. It lacks the military force to execute the Ukrainian campaign
 without calling on Syrian reinforcements. China is not in a position to send
forces to aid Russia. First, saving Russia’s campaign would provide no direct
 benefit to China, and a Chinese intervention could be disastrous. Second and
more important, China has seen the impact of U.S.-led economic warfare. Becomi
ng active in Ukraine or providing significant aid to Russia might trigger a si
milar economic attack on China.



China, like Russia, is not nearly as powerful as it appears. Its per capita gr
oss domestic product ranks 81st in the world. (Russia’s is 85th.) Its domesti
c market for sophisticated goods is limited. It must have the ability to expor
t, without which it destabilizes. The United States, even with tariffs on Chin
ese goods, is China’s largest customer. Facing both a loss of exports and an
economic war at a time when China’s economic growth rate is contracting and s
ocial tension over wealth inequality is rising would be dangerous. Invading Ta
iwan would be insane, as it would give China the only thing it has enough of
– land. It could also fail. And the U.S. economic response would be intense a
t a time when China’s economy cannot withstand it.

中國和俄羅斯一樣，並沒有看上去那麼強大。人均國內生產總值居世界第81位。（俄羅
斯排在第 85 位）其複雜商品的國內市場有限。它必須具有出口能力，否則就會破壞穩定
。即使對中國商品徵收關稅，美國也是中國最大的客戶。在中國經濟增長放緩、財富不


So we see Poland and Turkey taking on greater significance as a result of the
war, and China losing significance. There are many other reverberations. I cho
se these three, if it is not already obvious, because in my book “The Next 10
0 Years” I predicted the rise of Poland and Turkey and the decline of China.
So while there are many other effects, there is no reason not to start with th
ese.



心得感想：
幫大家一段一段的翻譯

簡單來說俄烏戰爭波蘭跟土耳其將會崛起

原因我就不一一贅述了

反倒作者說中國一堆問題

甚至說出侵略台灣只能拿到土地且有很高的機率失敗

建議大家如果有時間可以去借下一個一百年(2016出版的)這本書

內容十分有料

如果這篇貼文不適合貼在這邊等等會自刪
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