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卦點：林昶佐之前就說過，台北市長的職權涉國家主權以及統獨！(註1)吳崢也指出兩岸一

      現在重量級人士留學英國林飛帆出聲了！他投書《外交家》指出，柯P將讓年底大選
      籠罩在陰險狡詐的威脅之下！他甚至批評林昶佐，根本小看了「兩岸一家親」的危險
      ！！文中暗示柯P是連戰和馬英九對中政策的繼承人。你認為「兩岸一家親」跟九二
      崛起，他是中國的新代理人。投書後，不少粉絲在林飛帆的臉書下面推文支持，為
      林飛帆重返台灣政壇抬轎。

      以下投書為我個人翻譯，若有出錯請幫忙指出。

註1：#1RWB4e8v
註2：#1RW0AVm1
註3：https://youtu.be/Ka0FUVTKwU8?t=235 影片3:55處
註4：#1Rf4F-of

林飛帆投書《外交家》網址：
https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/will-taiwan-trap-itself-into-one-china-again/

標題：Will Taiwan Trap Itself Into ‘One China’ Again?
      In Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je, China might have found a useful wedge to
      influence Taiwan’s domestic politics.
      台灣會再次將自己陷入「一中」嗎？在台北市長柯文哲那裏，中國或許能找到一個
      切入點，能影響台灣的內政。

內文：

Taiwan’s commitment to resist China’s encroaching expansionism is under
challenge — not only from China, but from within, thanks to its upcoming local
elections. It is unlikely that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
administration, led by President Tsai Ing-wen, will accept Beijing’s
“One China” policy in the foreseeable future, given the strategic adjustments
of many democracies toward China and polls in Taiwan consistently showing that
there is little desire for “unification.” Still, the local elections in
Taiwan this November pose an insidious threat to its future stance. More
specifically, the current mayor of Taiwan’s capital of Taipei, Ko Wen-je,
a popular political figure campaigning for re-election and an advocate for
China’s core Taiwan policy doctrine that “two sides of the Taiwan Strait are
one family,” may inject uncertainty into Taiwan’s resolve to counter Chinese
aggression.


Much attention has been paid to Tsai’s refusal of the “1992 Consensus,” a
disguised “One China” policy embraced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
and the Kuomintang (KMT), currently the main opposition party. There are
likewise a wealth of reports about China’s intensifying campaign against
Taiwan since the DPP resumed office in 2016, including poaching Taiwan’s
diplomatic allies, coercing foreign companies to erase references to Taiwan,
restricting Taiwan’s participation in multiple international organizations,
and escalating military threats toward Taiwan. Yet relatively little has been
said about Beijing’s exploitation of — as well as its impact on — those who
desire to accommodate its assertiveness through adopting surrogate doctrines
and cultivating new proxies in Taiwan.

[按：意指兩岸一家親是九二共識的替代，柯P是北京的新代理人]。

History of China’s Containment of Taiwan From Within
中國從台灣內部進行封鎖的歷史

China has continually sought to penetrate Taiwan’s political system and
marginalize administrations which refuse to recognize Beijing’s “One China”
policy by aligning with pro-Beijing politicians and political forces. In 2005,
during the first DPP administration, Lien Chan, the former vice president and
former president of the KMT, visited then-Chinese president Hu Jintao in China,
forming a party-to party platform for negotiations that excluded the then-DPP
government. Lien and Hu concluded their meeting with a historical agreement —
the “Five-Point Vision for Cross-Strait Peace” — aimed at pursuing a peace
agreement as an political end of the cross-strait issue under the “One China”
framework. After the KMT returned to power in 2008, Ma Ying-jeou’s
administration extensively implemented those visions, signing all agreements
and cooperation schemes under the so-called “1992 Consensus.”


Ma’s approach pushed Taiwan into an asymmetric reliance on China both
economically and politically, offering China overarching leverage over Taiwan,
benefiting a few cross-strait businesses while sacrificing the majority of
domestic labor, and causing Taiwan’s constitutional democracy to deteriorate
in pursuit of the passage of those accords. While obtaining certain space on
the international stage, Taiwan’s presence was perceived as an “authorized
autonomy” granted by China, rather than evidence of its independence. This
path triggered a great backlash from civil society in 2014 and eventually led
to the KMT’s historic defeat in both local elections in 2014 and general
elections in 2016.


>From “the 1992 Consensus” to “Both Sides of the Strait Are One Family”
從九二共識到兩岸一家親

Against this backdrop, Ko Wen-je won a landslide victory as an independent in
the 2014 Taipei mayoral race. It could not, therefore, be more ironic that he
would then endorse the concept of China and Taiwan being “one family” and
“sharing a common destiny” soon after taking office, turning his success as
a once-breakthrough politician against the KMT’s dominance of Taipei into a
potential opening for Beijing’s infiltration.


Ko’s recognition of this terminology satisfies Beijing’s demand that
cross-strait dialogues at all levels must take place under the “One China”
framework. It has paved Ko’s way to attend the Taipei-Shanghai Forum since
2015 and ensures his ability to meet with high-ranking Chinese officials. While
some might argue Ko’s overtures are not a direct concession to “One China”
similar to that of the Ma administration, such claims are based on a
misunderstanding of Beijing’s overarching notion of “One China.”


Emphasizing the “kinship” between Taiwan and China has always been an
essential appeal of China’s strategy to contain Taiwan. The origin of this
concept can be traced back to 1979 with the “Open Letter to Taiwan
Compatriots” in which China addressed the “kinship” of people living on both
sides. Former Chinese presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao had extensively used
this phrase. Xi Jinping himself, likewise, deployed the phrase both as vice
president and later president of China when meeting with Taiwanese delegates
and leaders between 2010 and 2018. In 2017, the 19th National Congress of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) officially enshrined this concept, making it
a parallel doctrine to the “1992 Consensus” in its outline of future Taiwan
policy.


It is clear that “two sides of the Strait are one family” is a pivotal pillar
of both Xi’s and China’s Taiwan policy. If the so-called “1992 Consensus”
embodies Beijing’s sovereign claim over Taiwan, then the “one family”
doctrine fulfills China’s nationalistic claim in suggesting there is only one
nation on either side of the Taiwan Strait. In this era of frozen relations
between Tsai and Beijing, China’s welcome of Ko’s overture indicates that
the concept of “two sides of the Strait” being “one family” has been given
a more critical status than it was thought to possess, arguably as the latest
formula for Beijing’s co-opting of Taiwan’s rising political forces.


Given that local elections in Taiwan serve as midterm exams for the incumbent
central government, the importance of the role of the capital mayor in
cross-strait relations, as well as Ko’s high popularity — which has led to
him being frequently touted as a potential presidential candidate — Beijing’s
attempt to leverage this election should be concerned.


For instance, Chinese state-run media CCTV recently featured positive coverage
of Ko — a tactic similar to its previous propaganda for the KMT — which
arguably implies Beijing’s public endorsement of him. Indeed, Ko may be
China’s rare chance to establish a political beachhead in Taiwan by way of a
new political proxy, as the KMT is highly unlikely to win back power in the
short-term. Ko is a strong potential challenger for Taiwan’s presidency in the
coming decade, and his rise may well result from his populist leadership style
and nonpartisan nature, which allows him to tap into growing dissatisfaction
with both major parties — the DPP and the KMT,


It is unlikely that the majority of voters will accept Ko’s stance on China,
but there is a clear tendency to downplay Ko’s cross-strait stance among his
supporters due to his popularity. Even members from the pro-independence camp,
such as New Power Party legislator Freddy Lim, misinterpret the weight of Ko’s
“one family” phrasing in cross-strait relations.


Ko has had chances to readjust his stance on China, but has chosen to defend
his acceptance of the “one family” concept as a pragmatic approach that helps
Taiwan buy time. Despite such rhetoric mirroring the KMT’s in the past, Ko’s
accommodation of Beijing has not assuaged its assertiveness toward Taiwan in
any way. Rather, it has given Beijing more leverage to infiltrate Taiwan’s
domestic political debates and signaled a reincarnation of the KMT’s past
approach. In addition, the side effect of such overtures may further confuse
the international community’s perception of Taiwan, in which
misinterpretations perceiving Taiwan-China struggles as an “intra-family
dispute” are common.


Bulwark of Democracy vs. Orbit of Authoritarianism
民主的堡壘與威權的勢力

To date, Xi’s “Two Centenary Goals” for the “Chinese Great Rejuvenation”
have explicitly exposed China’s intention to challenge the geopolitical order,
with taking Taiwan as an integral part of that grand scheme. Cross-strait
relations, therefore, must be understood in the context of international
geopolitics and the global order rather than merely a cross-strait affair.


As a vibrant democracy standing at the forefront of this encroaching
revisionism, Taiwan’s determination to counter such expansion matters. Since
many countries are now adjusting their strategies toward China’s assertiveness
, including a growing concern over China’s interference in other nations’
democratic institutions, Taiwan should continue to make overtures to potential
democratic allies around the world to counter China’s attempts at aggression,
instead of placing itself again into an authoritarian superpower’s orbit.
Accommodating China might be perceived as a way to bolster short-term security,
but the price for Taiwan’s democracy and long-term capability to defend itself
from authoritarian aggression will be overwhelming.


As a rising political force, Ko’s tendency to embrace “One China” has
introduced a complicating factor into Taiwan’s future trajectory. Yet
Taiwanese people might still be able to push back against such inclinations
through a comprehensive examination of their political leaders’ stances.
Neglecting the fact that “two sides of the Strait are one family” serves as
a core concept of Beijing which traps Taiwan in an endless cycle of
independence-unification debates will not help us to transcend domestic
divergence.


Importantly, after experiencing Ma’s eight years of pro-China policy, Tsai’s
turn from China, and the possibility of Ko’s rise, whether Taiwan’s
commitment to counter China’s expansionism should continue to be bound by the
personal will of political leaders in the future is indeed questionable.
Further institutionalizing and consolidating Taiwan’s de facto independence
are considerably more essential than restricting itself under the ambiguous
discourse of “maintaining the status quo.” As China’s mounting assertiveness
poses the unprecedented challenge to the democratic world, it would be in the
international community’s best interests to support a free and independent
future for Taiwan.


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