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看板 MLB作者 jaylee2901 ( ˋ(′o‵")ˊ )
時間 Sat Jan 31 04:21:53 2015
The Strikeout Ascendant (and What Should Be Done About It) – The Hardball Times
To many, the rise of the strikeout has not been a good thing for the game of baseball. ...
The Strikeout Ascendant (and What Should Be Done About It)
http://goo.gl/U9u65M Chris Carter達成史上最高三振率
Major league baseball fans in 2014 witnessed something historic: A batter was
more likely to strike out this year than in any other season in the long
history of the sport, at a rate of 7.70 times per team per game.
Now, before we congratulate ourselves on having been present at some
particularly rare event, let’s bear in mind that the whiff rate of 2014
broke the previous record that had been set way back in…2013. And the 2013
record broke the all-time high-water mark achieved in 2012. Which had smashed
the standard set in, yes, 2011…and so on. Indeed, an all-time strikeout
frequency record has been set in every major league season since 2008.
That 2008 rate (6.77) eclipsed the record that had stood for an epoch of…
seven years. The 2001 mark (6.67) beat the record set in 1997 (6.60), which
was the culmination of another little stretch of year-in-and-year-out
strikeout record-setting that encompassed 1994, 1995 and 1996 as well as ‘
97. It isn’t until we get back to that 1994 record (6.18) that we finally
find one breaking a previous record that had stood for a long time: since
1967, when batters whiffed at a rate of 5.99 per team per game.
Thus, what we’ve seen in 2014 isn’t something unique to this year; rather it
’s the continuation (though, perhaps also the acceleration) of a historic
trend that’s been rolling along for two decades.
Why is this happening? And what would the (apparently likely) extension of
this tidal wave of Ks into the future mean for the sport? To answer these
questions, we need to understand how it is that we got here. So let’s embark
on a little history of strike three.
For comparative purposes, it makes sense to begin our tour not in the dim
original mists of 1869 or 1876, but rather at the point of physical placement
of the key protagonists (batter and pitcher) that still abides: 1893, when
the distance between home plate and the pitching rubber was set at 60 feet,
In Figure 1, we see the annual rate of major league strikeouts per team/game
from 1893 through the present day. What becomes clear right away is that the
long-term trend is distinctly upward. Thus, the first conclusion we can draw
is that whatever fundamental structural push that’s currently driving strike
three to become more commonplace isn’t new, but is instead something of an
eternal fact of baseball life.
But that isn’t all we see. It’s also clear that this long-scale effect hasn
’t held a constant pace. In addition to minor year-to-year up-and-down
fluctuation, history has presented a couple of fairly long periods in which
the strikeout rate stabilized at nearly imperceptible incremental growth.
And, most interestingly, we see that in opposition to the overall rise, there
have been two episodes of distinct decrease in K rate, the first occurring in
the late 1910s/early 1920s, and the second from the late 1960s to the
We know, of course, that in baseball (as in all the rest of the world),
change is the only constant. Changes in playing conditions, rules, tactics
and strategies have always been afoot. Let’s examine the strikeout rate
through the various eras within the context of particular conditions, rules,
tactics and strategies, as well as within the context of the other key
outcomes to which strikeouts relate: runs, hits, home runs and bases on balls.
1893-1919: The K Rises, then Falls 三振率先盛後衰期(1893~1919)
The term “Dead Ball Era” is generally meant to describe the period from
1901 through 1919. While mostly correct in associating a light-hitting,
low-scoring mode of play with the softer rubber-centered baseball, in fact,
the cork-centered “lively” baseball was introduced in 1911, and moreover,
the rubber-centered “dead” ball was in use during the very high-scoring
1890s. So it’s clear that while the resilience of the ball itself was a
factor in determining the way the game was played, other issues were
important, as well.
1901~1919被稱為死球時代 1911以前用的是橡膠核心球 1911之後用的是軟木核心
The major factor causing the drop in hitting and scoring and the sudden rise
in strikeouts that took place in the earliest years of the 1900s was the
adoption of the foul-strike rule (in 1901 in the National League, and 1903 in
the American). But we see that following the stratospheric peak of 1894,
hitting and scoring had been in decline across the 1890s, while strikeouts
had been holding steady at the very low rate of just over two per game. So it
’s evident that general improvement in pitching technique (as pitchers
adapted to the 60-foot, six-inch distance) as well as, especially, fielding
(including gloves and positioning/relay tactics, reacting to the
harder-hit-ball environment) were already underway before scoring fully hit
But one thing held steady through this entire era: home runs were extremely
rare. The heavy hitting of the 1890s was contact-oriented, with lots of
singles, doubles and triples, but few homers; through the entire decade only
one batter hit as many as 20 in a season (Buck Freeman with 25 in 1899). The
intermittent bump in hitting and scoring that accompanied the arrival of the
cork-centered ball in 1911-12 was propelled by line drives, not big flies,
and as pitchers re-established dominance across the 1910s (by ardently
exploiting the spitball and other foreign substances, and also by more
liberal deployment of relievers) the home run remained an extremely
這時期明顯的特徵是全壘打稀少 這時期的打者喜歡碰球(10年間只有Buck Freeman一人
單季打超過20支全壘打) 而引進軟木核心球只讓打者爽了兩年 因為這時期的投手很懂得
在球上面變花樣 ("pine"da 表示) 整體三振數往上提升
單季打超過20支全壘打) 而引進軟木核心球只讓打者爽了兩年 因為這時期的投手很懂得
在球上面變花樣 ("pine"da 表示) 整體三振數往上提升
And neither did the strikeout become common. After the big jump in the early
1900s, strikeouts stabilized at just under four per game and held steady
until the late 1910s; interestingly, through those years a strikeout was just
about exactly as likely (or unlikely) an occurrence as a run. For all its
turbulence, from the beginning of this period through its end, one batting
ethos remained dominant: to strike out was to utterly fail. Putting the ball
in play was always the primary objective.
三振一樣稀少 每場不到4次 這是個鳥碰的年代 普遍觀念認為三振是丟臉的失敗
Fielding, despite its improvements, remained difficult, with bumpy fields and
rudimentary gloves, so to fail to challenge fielders was to give the defense
just what it wanted. And, in a circumstance with the home run nearly absent,
long-sequence offense was the only way to generate runs, so the cost of a
strikeout was additionally magnified. All of the most celebrated star hitters
of this period, from Billy Hamilton and Ed Delahanty, to Nap Lajoie and Honus
Wagner, to Ty Cobb and Joe Jackson and so on, shared a single characteristic:
They almost never struck out. A very small number of hapless early 1900s
batters struck out as many as 100 times in a season; they were the furthest
thing from hitting stars, and most soon washed out of the majors.
由於場地粗糙 守備技巧不成熟 加上很難幹炮 所以想辦法把球打進場內才是王道
At the very end of this era, a curious thing happened. In 1918-19, the
strikeout rate suddenly dropped. There is no ready explanation for it, as the
big rules/conditions changes that would begin in 1920 hadn’t yet occurred.
Perhaps in some mysterious way it had to do with the shortened season
schedules caused by World War I, or perhaps it was just a bizarre fluke, or
perhaps the boom in hitting success that we always consider as having begun
in 1920 was actually somehow getting a head start. For whatever reason,
batters struck out more rarely in 1918 and 1919 than they had since 1902.
1920-1945: The K at Rest 三振持平期(1920~1945)
Starting in 1920, of course, the baseball world fundamentally changed. The
causes began with the ball itself, in two definite ways, and perhaps a third.
First, the spitball and all other ball-doctoring techniques were outlawed.
Second (as a means of enforcing the first, and also as a means of making the
game safer following the beaning death of Ray Chapman), any scratched or
stained ball was removed from the game and a fresh white replacement
introduced. And third, new ball-stitching yarn was introduced in 1920, and
this (though it’s debated) in combination with more modern manufacturing
methods yielded a more tightly-wound, and thus harder, ball.
1920年開始禁止在球上面搞花樣 球髒了馬上換新 新的縫線技術改變了棒球生態
With the baseball easier to see and to hit hard, batters went to town.
Leading the charge, as everyone knows, was the spectacular Babe Ruth. His
towering success is often said to have convinced everyone else to eschew the
traditional choke-up-and-put-it-in-play approach and swing for the fences,
and while there’s some truth to that, in fact, the freewheeling slugger
remained a rarity through the 1920s and ’30s. The great majority of hitters
maintained a contact-focused approach. The main difference from the pre-1920
period is that with that the ball more readily squared up, batters just
generally found more success.
The Babe never struck out as many as 100 times (his high was 93), but he
fanned a lot relative to his peers, leading the league in strikeouts five
times and finishing second in seven additional seasons. Several other
prominent power hitters, following Ruth’s lead, belted lots of home runs
while striking out far more than any star before 1920. These included Hack
Wilson, Jimmie Foxx, Hank Greenberg and Dolph Camilli; the latter three all
tallied seasons exceeding 100 Ks yet were celebrated nonetheless.
貝比魯斯跟同梯的比起來簡直是風扇哥 5次單季風扇王 7次亞軍
Still, though the long ball was far more frequent than before 1920, the
typical team was hitting a home run only about once every two games. This era
’s high scoring was mostly a product of lots of singles, doubles and
triples. Strikeouts were down from their 1905-1917 peak, but they bottomed
out in the mid-1920s and rose only slightly thereafter. Through this entire
period of remarkable overall stability, strikeouts were always just about
exactly as common as walks and never approached as many as four per game.
As the 1930s gave way to the 1940s, hitting and scoring declined. This was
mostly a function of the inferior-quality baseball being used during World
War II (effectively, a return to the “dead” ball), but the fact that the
decline started before 1942 indicates it was more than that. Probably the
major cause was the introduction of night baseball beginning in 1935; though
night games were still rare, primitive lighting systems provided poor
visibility and clearly favored pitchers.
An interesting figure in these years was Vince DiMaggio. Like his superstar
brother, Vince was a top-notch defensive center fielder, but that’s where
the similarities ended. Joltin’ Joe DiMaggio, though he hit with terrific
power, was extremely old-school in that he practically never struck out.
Vince, on the other hand, fanned with great regularity: He reached the
century mark in Ks four times, and his 1938 total of 134 set a record that
would stand for nearly 20 years.
Vince DiMaggio was no superstar. He had good power, but his batting average
was poor. Yet unlike earlier journeymen with high strikeout totals, Vince D.
was allowed to stay in the majors (perhaps because of his last name) and was
deployed as a regular in eight seasons, while leading the league in Ks six
times. He may be seen as an indicator of a new tolerance for the strikeout.
Putting up stat lines that were strange at the time but would be considered
normal today, he was a harbinger.
Vince DiMaggio是這時期的亮點 單季134K刷新紀錄卻依然保有先發位置 或許和
Joe DiMaggio的名號有關 但這時期球隊已能容忍風扇王
1946-1972: The K Comes of Age K的時代來臨了(1946~1972)
The 1947 season is often described as the beginning of modern major league
baseball, because racial integration began then. Certainly that’s a valid
point. But beyond the issue of who was allowed to play, the period beginning
in the late 1940s—and most definitely, the decade of the 1950s—also can be
properly comprehended as the beginning of the modern style of major league
No statistic better illuminates the changing mode of play than the strikeout.
The new style was power-centered, a game of heightened reward and heightened
risk. In 1948 and 1949, the record home run rate was threatened, and then it
was shattered in 1950. Newer still home runs-per-game records were
established in 1955, 1956, and 1961. In the wake of all this swinging from
the heels, batting averages declined, and strikeouts flourished as never
before. The strikeouts-per-game record that had stood since 1911 was
overtaken in 1952 and then broken again every year from 1955 to 1962. Vince
DiMaggio’s individual record of 134 strikeouts in a season was broken by Jim
Lemon in 1956 (138), and that was eclipsed by Jake Wood in 1961 (141), and
that by Harmon Killebrew in 1962 (142).
強力棒球時代來臨 打者越來越敢拚 1955、1956、1961年全壘打紀錄不斷堆高
三振數也屢創新高 1911年的史上K哥之王在1952換人做 從1955~1962三振王不斷破紀錄
The causes of this dramatic new phenomenon were several. Fielding efficiency
was steadily improving, and hitters were plainly dispensing with the
traditional put-it-in-play approach. Pitching staffs were making ever-more
sophisticated use of the bullpen, and pitchers working shorter stints worried
less about pacing themselves and instead just threw harder. Team management
advanced the dynamic, as field managers filled lineups and general managers
stocked rosters with more power-oriented hitters, and owners, sensing that
fans did indeed dig the long ball, frequently moved outfield fences inward to
stimulate home run totals.
守備技術精進 碰球哥漸漸討不到便宜 投手分工變精細 短局數投球讓投手更敢催落去
Another factor was the changing nature of the athletes themselves.
Particularly by the 1960s, arriving on the scene was a generation of young
men who’d been raised amid unprecedented abundance, with better nutrition
and health than ever before, and they were taller, bigger and stronger than
ever before. Stronger hitters were prone to go for the bomb, and stronger,
harder-throwing pitchers were prone to exploit this tendency and pitch for
1960年代的球員在營養充裕的環境長大 各個頭好壯壯 打者愛幹炮 投手愛三振
And with all this going on, the Lords of Baseball threw gasoline on the
flames with an ill-advised rule change prior to the 1963 season: enlarging
the strike zone. The motivation was a desire to shorten the length of games,
whose pace had been slowed by deeper counts and more frequent pitching
changes. The bigger strike zone succeeded in speeding up the game, but it did
so at the expense of batting averages and long-sequence innings. Scoring
plummeted and strikeouts soared, with the 1962 K record rate being
obliterated in 1963, and that record was surpassed again in 1964, ’65 and ’
The poster player for this era was Dave Nicholson. A big, strong (6-foot-2,
215-pound) right-handed-batting outfielder, Nicholson was signed out of high
school in 1958 to a big-bonus contract by the Baltimore Orioles. Confident he
would emerge as a slugging star, first the Orioles and then the White Sox
gave Nicholson opportunities at the major league level, in which the
youngster did indeed deliver home runs, but he was unable to hit for any kind
of average, as he struck out at appalling rates. In two trials with
Baltimore, Nicholson struck out 131 times in 286 at-bats, and in his one
mostly-regular season for the White Sox in 1963, he blew away the record by
fanning 175 times in 449 at-bats.
代表性球員Dave Nicholson在金鶯286AB被K了131次 在白襪449AB被K了175次
League-wide, by 1968 the shrinking run totals were agreed by all to have
reached a crisis. For 1969, the strike zone was returned to its previous
dimensions, and the height of the pitching mound was lowered. This yielded
immediate scoring improvement along with strikeout reduction. However, the
run-production effect was short-lived, as scoring declined from 1970 heights
in 1971 and ’72, prompting the American League to enact the extreme measure
of the designated hitter rule beginning in 1973.
1969年好球帶改回原來大小 投手丘高度降低 1973年美聯實行DH制
1973-1992: The K Meets Resistance 三振數下降期(1973~1992)
Removing pitchers from the batters’ box in one of the leagues was bound to
decrease strikeouts, but it wasn’t the only way in which teams endeavored
(wittingly or not) to reverse the trend of fewer balls in play. The wave of
new ballparks arriving in the 1960s and early ‘70s tended to have larger
outfield dimensions than those they replaced. Moreover, many parks (new and
old) deployed artificial turf in this era. The combined effect was to make
home runs more difficult to hit and to place a new premium on speed and
defensive range. Teams responded by turning back the clock in roster and
lineup-management choices, deploying fewer slow-footed sluggers than had
become the norm in the 1950s and ‘60s, and finding more room for faster,
slimmer athletes who tended to focus on old-school contact hitting.
1970年代許多新球場採用人工草皮 且外野變得深遠 使得靈活具速度的球員重回舞台
The erosion in batting averages was arrested, and despite fewer home runs,
scoring stabilized. Not only was the 1967 strikeout peak never approached in
the 1970s, strikeout rates following 1972 were similar to those of the late
1950s and very early ‘60s.
But as the 1980s unfolded, very gradually things began to change again.
Artificial turf had proven unpopular with players and fans alike, and it was
phased out of all but a few stadiums. Playing on grass, teams again felt safe
deploying bigger and slower fielders, and hitters, seeing the advantage of
upper-body strength, began to favor weight training as never before (and, of
course, more than a few sought to optimize the weight training with the use
The overall effect was incremental, essentially imperceptible at first, but
by the mid-1980s it was apparent that the game was different than it had been
in the ‘70s. Scoring was up only slightly, but the construction of runs was
resembling that of the 1950s, as the 1985 home run rate (0.86 per game) had
been exceeded only twice since 1962. The revived power game was coming at a
price of revived strikeouts, as the rate in both 1984 and ’85 was the
highest since 1972.
Then in 1986, and especially in 1987, these trends rapidly accelerated. Power
hitting and scoring jumped (indeed, in ‘87 an all-time rate of home runs was
achieved, surpassing one per game for the first time), and at the same time
strikeouts spiked, very nearly matching the peak rates of the mid-1960s.
It was commonly observed that hitters were achieving their newly shaped
success with the apparently inadvertent assistance of umpires, who appeared
ever-less willing to call the strike zone as defined in the rule book. Nearly
nothing above the belt was a strike (though, curiously, pitches several
inches off the plate low and away frequently were).
MLB cracked down prior to the 1988 season, issuing an edict to umpires to
enforce the strike zone as the rule book intended or face replacement.
Umpires complied, and the result was a sudden return to early-‘80s levels of
power hitting and scoring. Unable to take and rake with the confidence they’
d gained mid-decade, batters struck out slightly less often, though the rate
stabilized at a level distinctly higher than that of the 1970s.
Then, suddenly and dramatically, new changes arrived.
1988年聯盟要求裁判修正好球帶 讓各項數據稍微下修 接下來的時期是巨變的開始
1993-2014: The K Triumphant 狂K時期(1993~2014)
Exactly why the nature of the game transformed so rapidly beginning in 1993
was hotly debated at the time and has remained so ever since. What’s certain
is that it was not a single factor but the combination of many.
Hitters suddenly enjoyed success they hadn’t known for decades. Scoring
reached heights not seen since the 1930s, and the rate of home runs was
unprecedented, with new league-wide records being set in 1996, 1999 and 2000.
Yet all this raucous bashing was not accompanied by a decline in strikeouts:
Instead, as we know, season after season, strike three was occurring at rates
never seen before.
1993年開始打者爽翻天 1996、1999、2000連年破全壘打紀錄 但是三振數卻並未減少
It was an altogether new form of baseball. To what degree it was purposefully
engineered by MLB (presumably as a means of pleasing fans with an
action-packed brand to counteract the depressing effects of the mid-1990s
labor strife) is anything but clear. But in any case, the wave of new
ballparks coming online as the decade advanced was distinctly hitter-friendly
(and significantly, one was at mile-high altitude). And, though it’s never
been proven, much less admitted as a conscious decision by MLB, it seems
nearly obvious that the liveliness of the ball increased beginning in 1993.
It’s plainly obvious players were bigger and stronger than ever before, to
whatever extent enhanced by steroid use. Added strength helps pitchers at
least as much as it does hitters (as it had done in the 1950s and ‘60s), and
the overall effect is more strikeouts along with more power.
Though it didn’t capture nearly as much media and fan attention at the time,
a key factor fueling the run explosion of the 1990s was a boom in the rate of
walks. After having held fairly steady since the re-imposition of the
traditional strike zone in 1969, the rate of bases on balls climbed in the
1990s, until in 1999 and 2000 it was approaching an all-time high.
Clearly, this particular phenomenon was not something desired by MLB’s brain
trust, as following the 2000 season, baseball cracked down on umpires again
(as in 1988) to call the strike zone articulated in the rule book. And this
time, MLB enforced the edict by introducing an automated system (often
referred to as QuesTec, for the company supplying the technology) to measure
umpires’ strike-calling accuracy and provide objective feedback to them.
The impact of the new strike-calling protocol was immediate and significant.
In 2001, the walk rate dropped back to historically normal territory. Though
home runs remained at very high levels through the 2000s, and scoring
remained quite healthy, the “silly ball” heights of 1999-2000 have never
again been reached.
As for the strikeout rate: In 2001, it peaked, and then it dropped a bit and
stabilized. But beginning in 2006, it began to climb again and has been
climbing ever since into ever-higher record territory.
Significantly, beginning in 2010, the high rates of power hitting and scoring
that had been sustained since 1993 began to wane, and walk rates also—
gradually but steadily—have dropped. Through 2010, historically high
strikeout rates were a feature of a high-scoring environment, but
increasingly that’s no longer the case. The dynamic currently underway bears
more than a little resemblance to that of the mid-1960s.
HR、BB、H在2010年以後下降 但K卻上升 和1960年代很相似
Yet the shape of the game today is somewhat different from the ‘60s. Even
with the recent decline, today’s scoring is slightly higher than it was
then, and so is the rate of home runs. But in the mid-‘60s, when for the
first time strikeouts far surpassed the frequency of runs, they never
approached the rate of hits. In the 2010s, strikeouts are not just far more
common than runs, they are now approaching the frequency of hits. We’re
nearing a point at which batters will be more likely to strike out than to
reach base with a hit, a situation quite unlike anything ever imagined in
1960年代三振首次超越得分 但到了2010年代三振不但海放得分 還開始逼近安打數
And today’s strikeouts don’t occur evenly throughout the game. Modern
starting pitchers, though they fan more batters than they used to, are the
least likely on the staff to rack up strike three, so hitters manage to put
the ball in play with something comparable to historically normal frequency
through the fifth or sixth inning. But once the starter is out (which he
almost always is, rarely later than the seventh), a parade of relievers
marches in, each working an extremely short stint. Most throw extremely hard
(virtually every bullpen now includes multiple relievers who routinely exceed
95 mph), and produce strikeout rates never seen before.
今日的三振集中在比賽後半段 也就是牛棚time 牛牛們在極少的局數中盡情催速
For many decades, relievers have produced greater strikeout rates than
starters, and in the modern era, relievers’ increasing share of the innings
load increases the impact of this effect. To illustrate: In 1954, relief
pitchers worked 26.8 percent of the innings and contributed 28 percent of all
strikeouts. By 1984, they were up to 30.1 percent of the innings and 32.7
percent of the Ks. And in 2014, relievers handled 33.5 percent of the innings
and produced 36.7 percent of the strikeouts. Thus, today’s strike threes are
rarely achieved by heroic stars along the lines of Bob Feller, Nolan Ryan or
Randy Johnson, and instead are commonly recorded by essentially anonymous,
replaceable relief pitchers who come and go from team to team and rarely
sustain a long major league career.
在1954年 後援投手工作局數佔26.8% 貢獻了28%的三振
到了1984年 後援投手工作局數佔30.1% 貢獻了32.7%的三振
如今2014年 後援投手工作局數佔33.5% 貢獻了36.7%的三振
如今2014年 後援投手工作局數佔33.5% 貢獻了36.7%的三振
The K Lessons Presented 從這麼多K我們學到甚麼
The tendency toward increasing rates of strikeouts, while certainly
accelerating in the present day, is not uniquely modern but is instead an
elemental function of the eternal battle between hitter and pitcher. While
the dynamic has been interrupted from time to time, the default condition is
weighted toward ever-more frequent strike threes. The factors favoring growth
in strikeouts include a willingness of batters to swing for power at the
expense of contact, but are mostly driven by the willingness—and, most
significantly, by the ability—of pitchers to pitch for strikeouts at the
expense of in-game endurance, as they are deployed in ever-shorter stints.
The persistent decade-upon-decade increase in the size and strength of
baseball players feeds both of these tendencies.
三振率上升的速度越來越快 這起因於投打對決的本質 除了打者願意拚大支外
In discussions about this issue (and/or the issue of declining scoring rates
in general), one often encounters an assertion to the effect of, “These
things are cyclical. Left alone, current trends will revert toward historical
equilibrium.” However, baseball history provides no evidence to support such
an assertion. Indeed, the historical record indicates that reversal of
long-scale dynamics occurs only through imposition (whether intentionally or
not) of significantly new conditions. Therefore:
If no changes are undertaken, we will see ever-greater rates of strikeouts.
As the rate of strikeouts overtakes the rate of hits, batting averages, base
runners, long-sequence innings, and scoring will continue to decline.
目前的趨勢是三振多 安打少 壘上跑者少 得分少
So What? 那又怎樣?
There is no objective “good” or “bad” to any of this. One’s preferred
style of play is entirely a matter of aesthetics. If you’re a fan who loves
strikeouts and isn’t so crazy about ground balls or singles, then bully for
you. Baseball has never been better, and will only improve.
這沒有好壞之分 如果你喜歡投手戰 那這是好事
But for many fans—especially, it must be admitted, those of us who’ve been
privileged to closely observe the game for many decades—the baseball we’re
watching today is distinctly suboptimal, and increasingly so. Today’s game
presents ever-fewer balls batted into the field of play, and therefore
ever-fewer challenges to fielders to catch and throw the ball, as well as
ever-fewer base runners facing the split-second decision to stay put or
attempt to advance, to force a throw and risk a tag play. For fans like us,
today’s baseball is therefore less interesting than it once was, and can be.
Make no mistake, it’s still baseball, and we love it, but we know it can be
better than this.
少了許多壘上的跑者 和過去的棒球不太一樣 依然是棒球 但是少一味
Therefore, fans like us aren’t content to let the present dynamic roll
along. We advocate the imposition of thoughtful and careful changes in
rules/conditions, to do what can be responsibly done to push against the
inescapable and enduring pressure for ever-more strikeouts.
Theoretical, But Not Practical 理論上可行的方法
One thing that would reduce the ability of batters to hit home runs, while
simultaneously increasing the value of speed, would be to move outfield
fences outward. This generally happened in the 1970s, and the impact of
increased contact-hitting was significant. However, given modern stadium
configurations, this simply can’t happen. Outfields are almost never bounded
by easily-movable chain-link fencing these days, but are instead limited by
permanent grandstand structures. Until a new stock of ballparks is
constructed, the only direction fences can be moved practically is inward,
and that would be precisely the wrong direction.
Another idea, definitely more radical, would be to move the pitchers’ rubber
backward from the longstanding 60-foot, six-inch distance. Even a modest
increase, say six inches or a foot, would have the effect of reducing pitch
velocity and increasing batter response time. The evidence from 1892 to 1893
is that the result would be a dramatic increase in hitting and scoring
(though the evidence from the 1890s suggests it might not be enduring, as
pitching technique adapted). However, stadium configuration again presents a
practical obstacle: While it’s easy to move the pitchers’ mound in the
middle of the diamond, bullpens in most stadiums (major and minor league) are
frequently hemmed in to accommodate the traditional dimension. The difficulty
and expense of remodeling bullpens (not just in professional baseball, but in
all the amateur levels across the United States and in so many other
countries, where every aspiring pitcher develops) would likely prove
將投手板往後移藉此提升打者優勢 但這麼做不只MLB球場改變 小聯盟球場甚至各業餘
What Can Be Done 較可行的方法
Fortunately, several practically implementable options could be enacted by
themselves or in some combination. These include:
Reduction in the size of the strike zone. The evidence from 1963 and 1969
strongly suggests this can have a dramatic effect. The downside risk is that
along with stimulating hits, it would significantly increase the rate of
walks (and long counts in general), and just about no one finds the base on
balls to be an exciting play. Still, this obvious option merits serious
Reduction in the size of fielders’ gloves. Today’s players are better
athletes than ever before, and year after year, decade after decade, they
commit ever-fewer fielding errors. Steady improvement in fielding equipment
has only aided this dynamic. Imposing incremental reductions in the
size/efficacy of gloves would make fielding more difficult, increasing the
value of balls batted into play, and increasing the value of fielding
aptitude at the expense of power-hitting ability.
縮小野手的手套 現今選手失誤越來越少 隨著球具的發展讓這種趨勢更加明顯
Increase in the thickness of bat handles. Bill James suggested this more than
a decade ago, and it continues to be sensible. An increase in the minimum
circumference of the handle of the bat would render the lightning-quick “
buggy whip” power swing less effective for all but the biggest and strongest
of batters and thus would motivate a revival of old-school contact-first
approaches, especially if fielding the ball were slightly more challenging
than it is today. (Another method of rendering swinging for the fences less
productive—and thus potentially motivating swinging for contact—would be to
deaden the baseball. Simply doing this might have a similar effect as
thickening the bat handle. However, the World War II “balata ball”
experience indicates that a deader ball works entirely in favor of pitchers
and offers nothing advantageous to hitters, and in itself provides no
motivation for pitchers not to pitch for strikeouts. Even with a deader ball,
a strikeout is safer for pitchers than a ball hit into play.)
將球棒握把加粗 Bill James很早就建議這麼做 可以促使鳥碰型球員重回舞台 搭配提高
Increase in the typical length of pitchers’ stints. Of all the factors
stimulating the historic increase in strikeout rates over the decades, the
more frequent deployment of relief pitchers into shorter stints appears to be
the most significant. (Ever-more frequent mid-inning pitching changes are
also a major element disrupting the pace and flow of games.) There are two
obvious ways this trend could be reversed: a limitation on the number of
pitching changes per inning/game, and/or a reduction of the number of
pitchers included on the 25-man roster. (The latter would have to be enforced
by a requirement that a pitcher demoted to the minor leagues could not return
for a significant time, such as 30 days.) Making it necessary for teams to
deploy fewer pitchers per game would require pitchers to work longer stints,
thus requiring them to pace themselves and more readily pitch to contact than
simply overpower hitters.
Every change in rules and regulations brings risk of unintended and possibly
negative consequences. Certainly that’s true of each of these suggestions.
But to enact no change, and to expect current (and long-term historical)
trends to slow or reverse themselves, is the height of folly.
If MLB does nothing, we will continue to see the rate of strikeouts climb to
ever-unprecedented levels, and therefore continue to see ever-fewer plays in
the field and ever-fewer runners on the bases. Here is one voice raised in
favor of striving to act to improve the quality of the game we love.
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推 alfneta: 好長… 先推！ 1F 01/31 04:33
推 ivanhome22: 推！ 2F 01/31 04:45
推 ChrisDavis: 呼~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 3F 01/31 04:46
推 jjack1226tw: 好長推XD 4F 01/31 05:30
推 DCR: we are fine...newer generation will learn to play without 5F 01/31 06:36
推 EEERRIICC: 推 最後光芒有跟笑臉一起破單季三振紀錄嗎 6F 01/31 07:10
推 tgsh: 投手球速越來越快，打者力量雖然也有越來越強，但反應速度難 7F 01/31 07:19
→ tgsh: 以相應提升那麼多...這是我猜想的原因
→ tgsh: 以相應提升那麼多...這是我猜想的原因
推 ZaneTrout: 同樓上！古巴恐怖投手越來越多！ 9F 01/31 07:31
推 batistuta823: 推 10F 01/31 08:53
推 Tyrone: 不管是哪一項調整方案，會不會導致投手大量開刀… 11F 01/31 08:56
→ Tyrone: 那就不是大家所樂見的了
→ Tyrone: 那就不是大家所樂見的了
推 Roshiel: TJ手術的進化也讓強力投手存活時間變長 13F 01/31 09:28
推 pttlolo: 推，感謝分享 14F 01/31 09:49
推 jesusnotme: 好文推~~~~~小弟喜歡投手戰XDDD 15F 01/31 10:12
推 sw926301: 推 16F 01/31 10:22
推 searoar: 我懷疑是聯盟要抵制魔球的做法 17F 01/31 10:24
推 jet113102: 其實我覺得醫學的進步也間接影響投手的生命以及強度 18F 01/31 10:28
推 Lasvegas: 推~ 19F 01/31 10:39
推 galaxier: 推好文 20F 01/31 10:50
推 The5F: 抓藥越來越嚴格 沒藥吃了~~打者能力下降 21F 01/31 10:52
推 genteme: 推!!!! 22F 01/31 10:56
推 MichaelBourn: 蛋哥退休了 三振應該會開始少一點 23F 01/31 11:02
推 chenhaohao: 專業推 24F 01/31 11:04
推 TokyoHard: 只從三振來評斷是很片面的.三振也只是一出局 25F 01/31 11:06
推 maxspeed150: 三振和其他種出局數有根本上的不同 26F 01/31 11:24
推 TokyoHard: 我不覺得有根本上的不同耶.當之前大家提倡完整揮擊, 27F 01/31 11:25
→ TokyoHard: 不要鳥碰的觀念大家都實行的下場,就是三振會變高吧
→ TokyoHard: 不要鳥碰的觀念大家都實行的下場,就是三振會變高吧
推 maxspeed150: 隊投手來說有根本上的不同 29F 01/31 11:27
→ maxspeed150: FIP會計三振而不會計其他的 就是因為這是投打間最純
→ maxspeed150: FIP會計三振而不會計其他的 就是因為這是投打間最純
→ TokyoHard: 如果從得分長打上壘合起來看才比較好,當然這邊就是衰退 31F 01/31 11:27
→ maxspeed150: 的結局 相比之下只要ball in play就有可能會出事 32F 01/31 11:27
→ TokyoHard: 你講的跟我想說的其實不太相同啦 :) 33F 01/31 11:28
推 takamiku: 打者揮棒型態有差 所以造就出投高打低局面 34F 01/31 11:29
→ TokyoHard: 像文中只提投手運用造成,卻不提打者觀念是否變了 35F 01/31 11:29
→ TokyoHard: 會有點見樹不見林,以分析來說少了這塊
→ TokyoHard: 會有點見樹不見林,以分析來說少了這塊
推 maxspeed150: 裡面有提啊 37F 01/31 11:31
推 KKyosuke: 有啊 從碰球到追求HR那段不就是講這個38F 01/31 11:51※ 編輯: jaylee2901 (188.8.131.52), 01/31/2015 12:11:14
推 Ayukawayen: 讓鳥碰傳統技藝復興的方法: 取消游擊手39F 01/31 14:03
推 bellyuki: PUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUSH40F 01/31 14:03
推 MrNeverDie: 推！41F 01/31 14:13
推 gary63122: 關吃藥屁事42F 01/31 14:15
推 crownwell: 推推43F 01/31 14:53
推 MazdaRx7: 值得一推44F 01/31 15:14
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