The Warring States Era is a fascinating period in Chinese history. Although scholars debate the exact start date and duration of the era, the general consensus is that the period spanned from around 475 BC to 221 BC. Put simply, the era consisted of interstate conflict in which the leaders of independent states (and sub-states) vied for hegemony. The leaders engaged in a series of conquests and annexations, power and territorial consolidations, and shifting alliances. The competition resulted in the emergence of several dominant states. And these states continued competing for power in the nterstate isystem until the leader of the Qin state,Qin Shihuangdi, prevailed as the dominant ruler.

战国时代是中国历史上一个迷人的时期。尽管学者们争论着这个时代的准确开始时间和持续时间，但一致的共识是，这个时期大约是从公元前475年到公元前221年。简单地说，这个时期由国家冲突构成，即这些独立的国家（和它的附属国家）争夺霸权。统治者们进行了一系列的征服和兼并，力量和领土融合，转变联盟。这些竞争导致出现了几个占优势地位的国家。这几个国家在这种体制下继续为了权力竞争，直到秦国的统治者秦始皇，成为最终的统治者胜出。

Emperor Qin asserted supremacy and unified the states under one rule. He achieved this goal through the use of military force. He then established a complex bureaucracy in order to better unify and administer the previously fragmented state system. Some China experts, such as John Fairbank and Merle Goldman, pointed out that the emperor also undercut local ties and loyalties, fostered obedience to the state, and increased the state’s military power in order to maintain and strengthen state unity and survival. Qin – known as the unifier – ended the chaotic, fragmented, and competitive state political system and created a stable, unified, and more prosperous state system.

秦始皇认为，霸权和统一国家都是在一个规则之下。他通过使用武力实现了这个目标。随后，为了更好的统一和管理这些以前分散的国家，他建立了一个复杂的官僚系统。一些中国专家，如John Fairbank和Merle Goldman，他们指出，（通过一些政策）皇帝也削弱了地方的联系和忠诚，培养（他们）对这个国家的盲从，增长国家的军事力量，以保证和加强国家的统一和生存。秦——被认为是统一者——结束了混乱、分裂、竞争状态的国家政治体系，建立了一个稳定的、统一的、更繁荣的国家体系。

However as one China expert, Monte Bullard, points out, the overall Qin legacy is not seen as a “positive” example in Chinese history (the Chinese tend to examine history for “positive” and “negative” examples). The leaders were ruthless. They established a highly ordered society that was highly obedient to the state. And they used the rule of law – not the code of behavior – as the basis for interaction. Some Chinese historians contended that the Qin leaders’ use of the rule of law led to its excesses. For this reason, the Qin legacy generally is viewed as a “negative” example in Chinese history. And this has implications for China today.

然而，中国通蒙特.布莱德指出，整个秦朝的遗物在中国历史上并不都是“积极正面”的（中国人偏向于用“积极”和“消极”来检验历史）。领导者们都是残忍无情的。他们建立了一个高度有序、高度服从于国家的社会。而且他们用法治来干预社会，而不是行为准则。一些中国的历史学家们认为秦朝领导者们的“法治社会导致了它的加速灭亡”。为此，秦朝在中国历史上被普遍认为是一个“消极”的例子。这一观点影响至今。

The state of affairs characterizing the Warring States era then – fragmentation, instability, chaos, and competition for power – is a real concern for the Chinese leadership now. Moreover, the outcome and aftermath of the Warring States period serves as both positive and negative examples for the Chinese leadership today.

当时的局势使得战国时代具有以下鲜明的时代特征——分裂，不稳定，混乱，争权——这也是当今中国领导人现在所关心的。而且，战国时代的结果和余波对现在的中国领导层也起到正负影响并存的作用。

It is well known that China is not a homogeneous state. The country is home to 55 minority groups who occupy roughly 60 percent of its territory. Conventional wisdom tends to suggest that the Chinese state is vulnerable to minority separatist movements in three strategic, geographic areas: Xizang, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. If an upheaval occurs in one of these regions, it could have a domino effect in the other regions home to separatist movements. So the Chinese leadership remains concerned that minority secessionist movements could challenge the integrity and stability of the Chinese state.

众所周知，中国不是单一民族国家。这个国家有55个少数民族，他们占据了约60%的领土。传统的看法是，中国很可能被来自三个战略地理区的少数民族分裂运动分裂，它们分别是西藏，新疆和内蒙古。如果这些区域有一个发生了动乱，就可能在易发生分裂运动的其它区域产生多米诺骨牌式的效应。因此中国的领导层一直担心少数民族分裂运动会威胁国家的领土完整和社会稳定。

But counter to conventional wisdom, the leadership also faces threats of instability from very different sources. As in the Warring States era, these threats originate from “states” with powerful systems. Specifically the threats come from one area functioning as an autonomous region, another region home to a powerful independence movement challenging the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) legitimacy, and yet another area typically home to influential leaders who are able to cultivate powerful factions. What’s more, the leaders in these areas control territory with engaged populaces, formidable economic systems, and effective governance structures. They are namely Hong Kong (now approaching a 2017 chief executive election), Taiwan, and Shanghai (now home to a new pilot free trade zone). For these reasons, these areas perhaps pose a greater threat to the internal integrity and stability of the Chinese state system than areas home to minority secessionist movements. The Chinese leadership recognizes this reality. So how does the leadership manage these potential threats?

但和传统看法不同的是，中国的领导层还面临着来自其他方面的威胁。就像在战国时期，这些威胁来源于其它有着强有力制度的“国家”。确切地说，这些威胁的来源地一个是特区，另一个是反共的独立运动的聚集地，还有一个是一些有能力拉帮结派的的领导者的大本营。更重要的是，这些领导者拥有坚实的群众基础，强大的经济体系和高效的政府机构。它们就是香港（即将进行2017年行政长官选举），台湾，和上海（现在是一个新的自贸区）。出于这些原因，这些地区，比起那些分裂运动盛行的地区，可能对中国维护领土完整和国家稳定造成更大的威胁。中国的领导层充分认识到了这一点。那么他们如何消除这些潜在威胁呢？

Like the Warring States era and its aftermath, the Chinese leadership aims to assert dominance over its entire territory, thwart the emergence of viable competitors, and maintain internal integrity in order to rejuvenate the Chinese state. The leadership uses methods from that ancient period such as consolidation and force, as well as other strategies, such as co-optation, accommodation, and a code of conduct.

From the Chinese viewpoint, controlling secessionist movements emerging from the minority regions is achievable. This is in large part due to the leadership’s policies of co-optation and accommodation. The leadership incorporates willing segments of the ethnic minority groups into the existing system. And it provides these minority groups with special treatment and favorable policies. This also is in part due to the policy of dominance in which the leadership leverages the threat or use of force over segments of the minority groups who are not part of the system and use violence to try to destabilize the Chinese state and society.

就像战国时期及随后时期，中国领导人想统治所有整个地区，把竞争对手扼杀与摇篮之中，并维护内部统一，从而永葆中国生机。中国领导人采用了古时候的方法，比如团结和武力，还有其他的战略，比如收编，和解，以及行为准则等方式。

在中国人看来，控制少数民族地区发生分裂运动是可行的。他们采取了收编和和解的策略。领导层把愿意加入的少数民族地区收编入了现有体系。然后给这些愿意服从的地区提供特别的待遇和有利的政策。与此同时，领导层还采取了其他强硬政策，打击那些扰乱社会治安和威胁国家安全的少数民族地区。

In contrast to the minority areas, however, the Chinese leadership has less ability to control and exert dominance over non-minority controlled areas, specifically Hong Kong, Taiwan and Shanghai. Moreover, the leadership might face a considerable domestic and international backlash if it attempts to assert control in these areas through the threat or overt use of force. So in these areas, especially Shanghai, it remains imperative that the current leadership, like the Qin legacy, weaken the leaders’ local ties and foster obedience to the center. Instituting a code of conduct, which includes promoting policies against official corruption and extravagance,helps achieve these goals. In areas like Hong Kong and Taiwan, the leadership uses policies of accommodation and co-optation, particularly in the economic and diplomatic spheres, in order to cultivate asymmetrical relations in which Hong Kong and Taiwan become more and more dependent upon the Mainland state.

然而与少数民族地区相比，中国的领导层却几乎没有能力控制或支配非少数民族地区，即香港，台湾和上海。再者，如果中国的领导层试图以威胁或武力为手段控制这些地区，他们很可能会遭到来自国内外的激烈反对。因此在这些地区，特别是上海，依然要削弱地方领导人的势力, 使其服从中央。在香港和台湾，领导层采用迁就和合作的政策，特别是在经济和外交领域，其目的是逐步建立一种不对等的关系，使香港和台湾变得越来越依赖于大陆。

I’ve been a student of Chinese affairs for some fifty years and I’ve read and written countless articles on the subject. J. M. Norton’s article is as good as anything that I’ve ever written and better than most of what I’ve read. :-)

Internally speaking, China is 92% Han, CCP’s authority is absolute and it permeates every facet of the Chinese society, it’s growth is on the up and up; it itself resembles the 1st emperor’s reign of the post-Warring-Period Qin Dynasty- the 1st unification of Chinese nations under a central government.

Externally speaking, China and its relationship with other nations, resemble very much like Qin, Chi, Chu, Yen, Han, Wei, Zhou (戰國七雄) of the warring period. The singular political stratagem of that period is 合緃 (vertical alliance to block Qin state), and 連橫 (Qin’s horizontal break through to void such blockage). Geographic location wise, imagine a cross: Qin is @ the 9 o’clock position, the other 6 nations are array to the right of Qin, from 12 to 6, and it’s most powerful rival, Chi, at the 3 o’clock location.

对内而言，中国的92%是由汉人构成，中共具有绝对权威并渗透到这中国社会的各方各面，并在一天天地壮大着，中共的地位就如同战国后将华夏诸国首次置于一个中央政府之下的秦始皇那样。

对外而言，中国和其他国家的关系也与战国时期秦齐楚燕韩魏赵(戰國七雄)十分相似。这时期最突出的政治谋略是合緃 (南北纵向联合起来封锁秦国), 和連橫 (秦国东西横向来打破封锁)。从地理位置上看列国像个十字，秦国位于西部，其余6国位于秦朝东部呈南北向分布，而与秦朝势均力敌的对手齐国，则在其正东方向

Absolute authority means the authority is above the law and can behave as no law. But everybody in China including the CCP members has to abide by the law, and will be prosecuted and punished in according to the law if he gets caught in breaking the law. Whether one agrees with China’s law or not, it is another issue; the fact is all Chinese including the CCP members has to behave within the confines of law; hence there is no absolute authority in China. Calling CCP’s authority absolute is case of libel.

In the 19th century the West invented Legal Orientalism which said China’s law is no law and Chinese civilization is not civilized, so the West could impose their law and civilization on China on the ground of lawlessness in China. The West applies the same trick on all their conquered land.

Legal Orientalism is the foundation the imperialist legitimize their extraterritorial judicial rights in China and in all their conquered lands on the moral high ground; through their extraterritorial judicial systems the West systematically loot China legally and righteously, and even can keep their illegitimate gains until now; the French court ruled that the French did not have to return the artifact they stole from royal garden in Beijing is the case of the point.

The sad part is a lot of Chinese adopted Legal Orientalism to demonize China, China is not only a victim of Legal Orientalism in the hands of Western and Japanese imperialists, and they are now even a victim of Legal Orientalism in those “don’t know what they are doing” Chinese hand too.

绝对的权威意味着权利凌驾于法律之上，从而使法律变得非法。然而包括党员在内的每个中国人都接受遵守着法律，如果他们违反了法律而被捕，会遭起诉并被惩处。是不是赞同中国的法律那是另一个话题了；而现实是包括党员在内的每个中国人都必须在法律的范围内行事，所以中国并不存在绝对的权威，说中共是绝对权威那可以算是诽谤了。

19世纪西方发明了《法律东方学》，其中说到中国的法律是非法，中国人的文明是未开化的，因此西方人在中国不必遵守该国法律，而是使用本国的法律和文明。西方人在他们所有被征服的地方都耍着这套把戏。

法律东方学是帝国主义将其在中国土地上行使治外司法权力合法化的基石，以及所有被他们征服土地上的道德制高点。利用治外司法权西方人从而能合法的正当的对中国进行有组织掠夺，时至今日，他们还紧紧攥着那些非法所得。正是如此，法国法庭才判决法国不必归会还他们从北京皇家园林里偷取的文物。

可悲的是不少中国人也抄起法律东方学来对自己祖国进行妖魔化，中国不仅仅是西方和日本帝国主义所操控的法律东方学下的受害者，还成了那些抄着法律东方学“不知其所为”中国人的受害者。

Whether it’s Qin or not, throughout China’s long history China had to deal with more nomadic barbarians than the whole world combined. The Huns, the Xirong, the Xianbei, the Khitans, the DongHu, Mongols, Manchus etc etc. Wu Hu Luan Hua is a famous quote that means 5 barbarians creating havoc. Therefore, China dealing with troublesome neighbors is not new.

不管是秦朝还是其他朝代，纵观中国漫长的历史，他们与野蛮的游牧民族对峙的时候比和民族融合的时候要多。匈奴人，西戎人，鲜卑人，契丹人，东胡人，蒙古人，满州人等等，著名的五胡乱华就是指5个蛮族制造浩劫。因此中国和那些讨厌的邻居打交道的事并不新鲜

The problem with the Chinese is that they give too much ‘face’ and privileges to some of the minorities like Tibetans and Uighurs. The treachery of Tibetans and Uighurs is not today event, it has been an on-going upheaval for thousands of years.

As both Tibetans and Uighurs don’t even want to understand what is national unity and reconciliation, the only better option to forge stability across both Tibet and Xinjiang is to populate them with overwhelming Han Chinese population. In the short term, it may harm China image for sure but then China can’t forever continue to face the same insurrection, for it to be deferred for the next generations to resolve.

藏人和维人甚至不想去了解民族团结与民族和解是什么东西，想要稳定藏区和新疆的唯一好办法就是用压倒性优势的汉族人口补充入当地。短期内，这也许会对中国的形象造成损害，但是中国不能总把这个状况推给下一代去解决，一代代人不断地面对暴乱的问题。

What’s wrong is when China imposes its “Code of Behaviour” on its non-Chinese neighbors. Arrogance and belligerence preventing China from respecting International Law. these may seem derogatory remarks, but only because it’s true.

中国把自己的“行为准则”强加于他的非华人邻国是大错特错了。中国的傲慢自大和好勇斗狠成为了尊从国际法的阻碍。我的话看起来有些犀利，但这都是实情。